Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 02:36 pm:

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Vjavasi:

brother manam pakistan centric thinking nunchi bayatapadali anukuntunna....we should have more global focus....

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 02:31 pm:

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Kamal:

adi saaransh !

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 02:30 pm:

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Jalsa:

kamalai, tokeega 2-3 sentences lo seppu vishayam ento

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 01:17 pm:

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Kamal:

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 03:30 am:

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quote:

Introduction

The India-Pakistan joint statement at Sharm-al-Sheikh during the NAM conference in which Balochistan was mentioned for no rational reasons has once again brought into sharp focus, lack of direction, absence of any strategic thought and a shocking unawareness of our national interest on part of our foreign policy establishment. Those who have been carefully following India's foreign policy since independence will not be surprised. Our foreign policy has been a continuous muddle ever since. A country follows a foreign policy so that gains are accrued. Here we have been following a foreign policy which has resulted in an unending chain of disasters. What is worrying is that no one seems to bother.

The Overall Foreign Policy Framework

When we became independent in 1947, a need arose to evolve a conceptual frame work of foreign policy. Nehru abrogated to himself the role of the sole arbiter of our foreign policy. Foreign office mandarins were only too happy to follow in his wake. They followed the dictum 'Papa knows best'. Nehru was heavily influenced by the Gandhian thought of occupying a moral high ground to put the adversary at a disadvantage. Since this model brought us independence or so it was thought , Nehru visualized that this concept could be applied to foreign policy as well. Non-violence and non-alignment became the cornerstones of our foreign policy. We deliberately overlooked the fact that Great Britain had been bloodied white in the Second World War and was in no position to hold on to its colonies and in a few years the mighty British Empire unfolded. We could have been in occupation of the moral high ground had we maintained equidistance from the two superpowers during the Cold War. But in practice we became a part of the Soviet camp. So the entire foreign policy approach was flawed from day one.

Armed Forces as an Instrument of State Policy

Unlike the West and even China, India has never had a strategic culture. Perhaps the reason was that India has never been an entity as it exists today. Akhand Bharat has only been a concept not a reality. The result was that invader after invader kept coming and we were subjugated to hundreds of years of foreign rule. This should have taught us that Armed Forces need to be co-opted in the foreign policy as an instrument of state policy. But it did not happen. There are two reasons for this glaring omission. One is the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence which heavily influenced Nehru and others at the time of independence. Immediately following partition in 1947, Nehru continued to ignore military considerations in dealing with foreign policy issues. A story goes that - The British General Sir Rob Lockhart, first Commander-in-Chief of free India's Armed Forces, was left in no doubt by his Prime Minister when he went to him with a Defence Paper, asking for a formal policy directive on defence. Nehru glanced through Lockhart's paper but was not in the least amused. 'Rubbish! Total rubbish!' the Prime Minister exploded (according to Lockhart). 'We don't need a defence policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned you can scrap the army - the police are good enough to meet our security needs'. It is thanks to the 'J&K war of 47-48' which brought home the harsh reality to our rulers. The second reason is that in the early fifties, when Nehru looked around, he found most of our neighbours and the countries of Africa and even Europe being ruled by military dictators. That gave rise to an unnatural fear of the Armed Forces and instead of co-opting them in the national foreign policy framework, all attempts were made to keep them out of the decision making loop. In fact, the single point agenda for the politician and the bureaucracy became emasculation of the Armed Forces. We have already paid a heavy price for this and unless the concept of using the Armed Forces as an instrument of state policy is understood, we will continue to be denied our due place in the comity of nations - our 8 percent annual growth rate notwithstanding.

The J&K Problem - A Self Goal

Nothing illustrates our muddle headed approach in foreign policy more than the festering store of the J&K problem - entirely our creation. When our Army was poised to clear J&K of Pakistan raiders and regular army, we took the issue to the UN, thereby turning a bilateral problem into a world problem. The problem gets compounded thereafter. Take the case of the UN Resolution of 1949 which is in three parts. Part I says there will be a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Part 2 says Pakistan must vacate aggression and withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from J&K and Indian administration will extend to the entire state of J&K as hitherto fore. Part 3 says that once conditions become normal, plebiscite will be held. So as shall be seen, the UN Resolution is highly favourable to us. Instead of trashing the UN Resolution, we should have been harping on Part II and not mention Part III at all like Pakistan only mentions Part III, ie, the plebiscite bit. After the '71 war we started saying that the Shimla Agreement supersedes all UN Resolutions. The world does not agree to this. A UN Resolution becomes null and void only when a resolution is passed to that effect and this has not happened yet in the case of J&K. Shimla was a golden opportunity to solve J&K problem once and for all, but we allowed this opportunity to slip by. The J&K problem will continue forever. (Idi Nehru and Indira la ghana nirvaakam - uncorrectable mistakes cost a grand nation .. idi ardam chesukuni chaavaru Congress guddi supporters .. emanna ante maa blood lo undi Congress raktam ani sollu vestaru .. evadikaina modalu undedi/undalsindi Bharata raktame .. taravate Congress aina BJP aina ! )

The Chinese Malevolent Shadow

If one word can describe Indian foreign policy as far as China is concerned since 1949, it is appeasement. We were one of the earliest to recognize the People's Republic of China. Incidentally the USA decided to do so only in 1973. When the Chinese marched into Tibet in 1950, we lacked the moral courage to condemn this act of blatant aggression. Not only that, from day one we started espousing the cause of China's admission into the UN even after its aggression in Tibet and Korea. This turned out to be the classic Arab and Camel story. China today is not only a member of the UN Security Council but opposes tooth and nail India's entry into the expanded Security Council if it ever comes about. On the border question, appeasement continues till date. We did not break off diplomatic relations with China even after the '62 war. Our China policy, if at all it is, lacks logic, is formulated as a result of irrational fear of China and non reciprocity, a great foreign policy failure which has resulted in our strategic encirclement with a rogue nuclear power Pakistan in the west, a sullen Nepal in the Centre and an inimical Bangladesh and Myanmar in the east. Bhutan is under pressure to cede territory to China and establish diplomatic relations with it which will effectively abrogate Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1950. The Chinese oppose everything that we do, whether in the Nuclear Supplier Group or Asian Development Bank and there is not even a whisper from us. Chinese transgressions and intrusions are taken with a stoic calm. This supine attitude is called maturity.

India's Pakistan Policy

Pakistan has been a craw in our gullet ever since its unnatural creation in 1947. The biggest challenge for India's foreign policy establishment has been on how to tackle Pakistan and it has miserably failed to evolve a coherent and consistent policy in respect of Pakistan. Pakistan has managed to outmaneuver us on all issues. There are two schools of thought on Pakistan policy. The 'bleeding hearts' say that a stable Pakistan is in India's interest while the 'hawks' want it to be dismembered into its four constituent provinces. India's mandarins have not been able to decide what policy to follow. On the other hand, Pakistan suffers from no such dilemmas. Its policy is clear. India must be balkanised by whatever means - fair and foul - war, proxy war, terrorism, nuclear blackmail, et al. It has successfully managed to convince most of the world that it is India which is in illegal occupation of J&K. What could be worse than this is that we have not been able to convince anyone that J&K problem is a creation of Pakistan right since 1947.

Tackling Terror

Perhaps the biggest failure of our foreign policy in recent times has been in tackling terror. We suffer Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks endemically and what is our response? Pull out the age old list of most wanted, dust it up and send it to Pakistan with great urgency who, with equal urgency, throw it into the trash can. Nothing illustrates our failure more than the recent joint statement in Sharm-Al-Shaikh where we allowed India's involvement in Balochistan to be included - and not a word on of J&K problem. Only a moron could have drafted such a disgraceful joint statement. And either our dear Prime Minister did not have the time to read it or he qualifies to be the most naïve Prime Minister in the world. And you think any action will be taken against anyone in the foreign office. Forget it. It never happens in India. We talk of evolving a joint terror mechanism with a country which is the epicenter of all terrorism in the world. One despairs whether we will ever learn.

A Sullen Neighbourhood - Proof of Bankrupt Foreign Policy

Has our foreign policy establishment ever paused to think as to why Bangladesh, which should be eternally grateful to us for its creation, has walked into Pakistani arms? Or why Nepal, which is landlocked and is crucially dependent on India for almost everything, is perpetually complaining? Their standard reply is that India is big brother in the region. So is America. Are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Honduras complaining. There has to be something wrong with our foreign policy that we have not been able to convince our neighbours that we are not poised to grab them at the first opportunity. The list of failures is long. We have failed to convince Bangladesh not to allow its territory to be used by the ISI, Chinese, ULFA and other terror groups. We have failed to convince Nepal that we only have it's welfare at heart otherwise we could have bled it white in ten days flat and China can do nothing to help them. Bhutan is conducting border talks with China in contravention of the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1950. Does it bother anyone? We rush in to advise Sri Lanka on issues we have no business to. Thank God Prabhakaran is no more, otherwise this was another problem stuck in our gullet. With Sri Lanka, we concluded the most puzzling Accord wherein we sat down with Sri Lankan leaders to decide Prabhakaran's fate, but the Accord does not bear his signatures. How was he bound by this Accord? No wonder be denounced this Accord soon as he was allowed to go to Sri Lanka by us. That old fox Jaywardhene let IPKF and LTTE fight it out. The other problem of our foreign policy in respect of our neighbours is that in our anxiety to be seen as a major power in the making, we only want to hobnob with important countries in the world and tend to take our neighbours for granted. This is a case of Nero fiddling while Rome was burning. The neighbourhood is in turmoil but we are busy ingratiating ourselves with the sole super power and others.

Non-Aligned Movement - Flogging a Dead Horse

Why are we keeping the Non-Aligned Movement on life support system long after the Cold War ended defies all logic? Even we gave it a near burial in 1962 when following Chinese aggression, we sought help of Western powers, particularly USA and UK by way of arms aid. Prior to this we had taken a hypocritical stance when for all practical purpose we were firmly in the Soviet camp and castigated the Americans at every opportunity. We did not learn a lesson even after the '62 war, when, except for Egypt, Malaysia and Ethiopia, not a single member country of the Non-Aligned Movement supported our case.

Conclusion

We Indians are a status quo people. No one wants to rock the boat. So this directionless foreign policy has gone on for six decades without anyone questioning its rationale, causing immense harm to issues of national interest. The policy needs complete overhaul and not cosmetic changes. Whether it will happen or not remains to be seen. The chances are that status quo will prevail.

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 02:58 am:

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A few month's back, Bharat Verma, Editor of the Indian Defence Review, in an article, had predicted that China may attack India by 2012. Frankly, at that time, I did not agree with this prophecy, because in my opinion China would not want a war till it becomes a true super power by 2050,and in any case the Chinese, in my opinion, would only go to war, if they had a 100 percent chance of success. Also China has now become India's leading trade partner, and common sense dictates that good economic relations are a logical antidote against war. Finally, in the event of war in the next five years, the Indian Navy would be in a position to wreck havoc with China's oil tankers, ferrying homewards, the Middle East oil, through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombak straits. The IAF, too would be utilised, and the Chinese "cake walk" of 1962, would not be possible. (This is for people who can think China has far too much advantage!)

However, two recent events have caused me to rethink, though I still feel that an Indo-China war is not likely, specially if India urgently reverses the current decline in its defence capability. The first event was the recent early September 2009 Chinese firing across the LAC (the first since 1986, and the first since the 1996 "no firing agreement"), in Kerang (northern Sikkim) where two ITBF jawans were reportedly injured (this report has been denied by the Indian Foreign Ministry). The second event was the firing on 12 September 2009, of five 107 mm rockets, by the Pakistan based Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), across the international border at Indian villages near Amritsar. Are these two firing incidents linked, coming as they do on the background of very disturbing reports of border incursions by our two hostile nuclear armed neighbours? While the Pakistani terrorist based actions are not new, the Chinese activities, sound similar to the ominous activities prior to the disastrous 1962 war.

Another serious mistake we are making is assumimg that the United States will pull our chestnuts out of the fire, by deterring China and pressurising Pakistan. While our broad national interests do generally appear to coincide with Washington, we must remember that no country will go to war against nuclear armed foes, unless directly threatened. Given Pakistan's undeniable geostrategic location, we should not expect the Americans to "take out" or "neutralise" Pakistani nuclear weapons, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the terrorists. Neither should we assume that America has joint control over Pakistani nuclear weapons. It is good to have close ties with the USA, but it's prudent not to outsource our national security to any external power.

Musharraf's latest admission on 14 September, about Pakistan diverting American aid to beef up its defences against India, and how he ensured Pakistan's strategic weapons programme was "speeded up", and China's latest border incursions, should finally clear the cobwebs from the minds of India's leadership. Why do we continue to suffer nasty surprises at the hands of Pakistan and China. Some 47 years after 1962, India has again been repeatedly surprised by China in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and in Uttarakhand. About nine years after Kargill, and 15 years after the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, India was surprised by Pakistani terrorists taking the searoute to cause a bloodbath in Mumbai on 26/11 in 2008. The fact remains that India’s lack of strategic culture has been repeatedly exposed, and its military has been required to fight under very disadvantageous conditions because our politico–bureaucratic leadership, has allowed defence preparations to fall below critical levels, while following a policy of "passive , low reactive defence" which relies more on diplomacy than military strength. Hopefully the restrictions imposed on the Indian Army not being allowed to patrol some "sensitive areas" on the Indo–China border will now be lifted before the Chinese grab more of our territory. Also hopefully, the Government will think about inducting the long delayed 155 mm artillery, and raising more mountain divisions before it's too late.

Their should be no doubt as to why Pakistan and its terrorists will always aim to cause mayhem in two places in India, viz Mumbai and Vadinar. Mumbai (its stock market turnover is four times Pakistan’s GDP) and Vadinar port in the Gulf of Kutch (it has three refineries with 99 million tons capacity and over two million tons of fuel storage). Yes, attacking foreign tourists in Goa will gain a lot of international publicity, but Mumbai and Vadinar are India's economic jugular, and attacking these will keep India economically hyphenated to Pakistan. Fortunately the Coast Guard's new North West Command, for Gujarat, headquartered at Gandhinagar has become functional, and is expected to be formally inaugerated by the Defence Minister in October. Hopefully, this new Command will urgently receive additional vessels and aircraft to ensure the safety of Gujarat, including Vadinar, because nothing can be more dangerous than creating a "paper force".

What is the second best method to attack Mumbai and Vadinar,after terrorism? The answer is cruise missiles with land attack capability, launched from ships, submarines and Maritime Patrol aircraft like the P-3C Orion. Theoretically, the 120 km range, Harpoon anti-ship missile with a 250 kg warhead fits the bill perfectly for Pakistan as an interim system, while its ratcheting up the production of its larger Chinese gifted, 500 km range Babur cruise missiles to build an estimated stockpile of 450. The long term aim of the Pakistani Babur cruise missiles (these can be delivered by fighter or Maritime Patrol aircraft to extend their range) is to counter India's over publicised Ballastic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and give Pakistan a "cheap", massive first strike capabilty which may overwhelm India’s nuclear retaliation capabilty. Right now, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is designed to counter India's superior conventional military power, but the Babur cruise missile along with new miniaturized plutonium warheads, will put Pakistan in a different league altogether.

The newer versions of the Harpoon, which Pakistan is hoping to acquire from the USA, already has a secondary land attack capability built in. What it has now apparently tested a few months back is the older anti-ship Harpoon, (about three dozen of these were acquired from the USA in the Reagan era). Given todays miniaturised Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), any missile specialist should be able to convert the vintage anti-ship Harpoon to a land attack capable missile with reasonably accurate chances of hitting the Oil refineries at Vadinar and the various installations in Mumbai port. The only problem would be how to replace the 250 kg conventional warhead in the 53 centimetre diameter cylnderical Harpoon missile with a plutonium miniature nuclear warhead. Most Indian scientists will tell you that it is impossible for Pakistan to achieve this. In my opinion India should expect China to transfer the technology of a proven miniaturised nuclear weapon which would fit the larger Babur, and possibly the Harpoon cruise missiles.

What are the launch platforms for the modified land attack Harpoon missile ? The answer is simple. The two older French built Agosta 70 submarines and the half a dozen American P-3C Orion aircraft are the ideal launch platforms. The missile has sufficient standoff range to hit Vadinar and Mumbai.

Global experts believe that "low tech" nuclear powers would need 8 kg of Plutonium 239 (PU 239) to make a bomb, while "medium tech" powers would need about five kgs, and "hi-tech" powers (including China) would need 3 kg of PU 239.The media has given enough details of the new Khusab 2 and 3 reactors , which will be expected to produce about 15 to 30 kg of Plutonium for 3 to 10 miniaturised nuclear weapons per year to Pakistan. Latest media reports indicate that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile has now grown from 70 to 90. I have no idea about India’s nuclear weapons stocks, and am uncertain about how many Agni type missiles India can produce per year. China will take Indian deterrence seriously only after we induct the 5000 km Agni 5. The recent controversy about the 1998 thermonuclear tests "fizzzle" has not cleared the air. I am not a nuclear weapons designer, but as a nuclear specialist, it is my opinion that lots of luck would be needed to get a complex thermonuclear prototype device to function properly the first time, and even if it did, it would need atleast two more successful, confirmatory tests in a rugged militarised form. Detterence works best, when it's based on hard realty, and not ambigious discussions. Also deterrence works best when the enemy leadership is itself threatened with annihilation by a politically firm Indian Government.

The Chinese, as expected have kept the pressure on India, with the latest news of its forces violating Indian territory in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Being masters of the art of long term strategic planning, the Chinese game plan is obviously to keep India tied down by the triple threats from China, Pakistan and Pakistani sponsored terrorists. India's foreign ministry should stop justifying China's daily incursions by talking about "the differing perceptions on the Line of Actual Control". China will stop its incursions only when it's deterred by India's conventional and strategic defence capability. We will need to change our "no first use" nuclear policy, and increase our defence expenditure from the present measely 1.99 percent of the GDP to atleast three percent of the GDP.

Ofcourse, the immediate threat to India is from terrorism by land, air and sea. In August, I was pleasantly surprised to see that the normally chaotic fishing vessel traffic in Mumbai port was now more disciplined. It was also heartening to see the Navy and Coast Guard maintaining round the clock vigil from boats and helicopters. Numerous visitors, enquiring about my health, also assured me that there was now unprecedented co-ordination and co-operation between the Navy, Coast Guard, Police, Customs, Intelligence Agencies and the port authorities. The real threat from the sea will come after early October, when the monsoon subsides, and the seas become calmer for permitting small boat terrorist operations. The recent 12 September rocket attacks from Pakistan on Indian villages near Amritsar, along with terror strikes in Srinagar, are pointers that things will only get worse, unless India responds firmly.

Given the decades of neglect, national security (including strategic deterrence) will need sustained funding for the next decade. The Prime Minister, while focussing on 9 percent GDP growth, and countering drought, will need to keep a very watchful eye on national security. The only insurance against any future disastrous, though unlikelym wars with China or Pakistan lies in deterrence, based on India investing heavily in conventional, counter terrorism and nuclear defence. If India fails to invest sufficiently on national security and displays palpable lack of political will, then there is a risk of minor border incidents spiralling out of control, and tensions escalating. The only danger this time, lies with Pakistan and its terrorists, also joining this unlikely doomsday scenario. We must have excellent economic and diplomatic relations with China, but we must also keep our powder dry. Our foreign policy should be backed by sufficent military power - something akin to a steel fist in a velvet glove.

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Posted on Sunday, January 17, 2010 - 02:49 am:

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Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was an awesome demagogue. Much before the technique became common currency in the inspirational-talks circuit, he used an 'interactive' approach to keep his audiences enthralled. In the course of his speeches he would invariably pose anodyne questions to his listeners and then await the roar of approval. I recall listening on the radio to one of his speeches during the troublesome aftermath of liberation. He posed the question "Do you want more roads?" and waited for the inevitable response. He then asked, "Do you want more buses?" and then gloated over the mass reply.

I am reminded of Mujib in the context of an epidemic of apparent brotherhood that has suddenly gripped a small section of the media and civil society in recent weeks. At numerous occasions we have been asked the question: "Do you want peace between India and Pakistan?"

The answer is obvious. Apart from a handful of crazies, there isn’t anyone in India who is opposed to peace in the neighbourhood, whether it involves Pakistan, China or even Burma. It doesn't require strategic affairs experts and Track 3 activists to tell us that India would rather be building roads and schools than diverting resources into expensive military hardware. I can't speak for Pakistan but, presumably, the overall feeling across the Radcliffe Line wouldn't be all that different. Sensible Pakistanis have had an overdose of jihad and wouldn’t mind exploring other facets of theology.

Of course, there is a flip side to the earnest desire for peace. There is an un-stated assumption that an undeclared war or, if you so prefer, a proxy war exists between India and Pakistan. It is a war that India has experienced in different ways throughout the past decade and which is also being waged in Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and the anarchic zones along the Indo-Burmese border. The war has made life insecure in Indian cities, created zones of treachery in ghettos, diverted tourist traffic and even made it difficult for people to accept Rs 500 currency notes without fear of forgeries. Yes, the late Gen Zia-ul Haq's "war of a thousand cuts" has cost India dearly - although Pakistan too has suffered from the blowback.

It is easy to buy short-term peace by following the essence of Mahatma Gandhi's intriguing advice to the persecuted Jews of Hitler's Germany: To be prepared for immeasurable suffering and even a massacre of the entire community since "to the god-fearing, death has no terror". In political terms this would involve withdrawal from the Siachen heights, agreeing to dual sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir and conceding Pakistan's overriding sphere of influence in Afghanistan. In other words, leave Pakistan with no substantial grievance against India and, presumably, emerge as such a morally superior nation that the Swedes would have no alternative but to confer the Nobel Prize for Peace on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

If you imagine this is a caricature, just examine the fine print of the writings of those who are praising the "instincts" and "tactical acumen" of the Prime Minister and advocating a "region-led" (as opposed to a "US-led") approach to Afghanistan. The grapevine in Lutyens' Delhi suggests that the advocates of such a foreign policy course-correction have the ears of the Prime Minister, but that could well be conjecture. Manmohan does have a penchant for encouraging others to assume the part of a stalking horse — witness Jairam Ramesh's role in the climate change debate — and taking refuge behind a shield of deniability. The joint Indo-Pakistani statement in Sharm el-Sheikh was one of the few occasions where he allowed full play to his "instincts" and "tactical acumen". The result was a shamefaced retreat before Parliament and a silly bid to blame the unacceptable formulations on "clumsy" drafting.

What has happened in the months following Sharm el-Sheikh to warrant an overdrive for peace? Pakistan has persisted with its obstructionist attitude towards investigations into the 26/11 Mumbai carnage; more evidence has emerged of Pakistani involvement in the massacre; the wafer-thin line between the Pakistani state and 'non-state players' such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has disappeared; Pakistan itself has been plagued by daily attacks on civilian and military targets by suicide bombers; large chunks of western Pakistan are in the midst of a civil war; the fragile civilian Government in Islamabad has become even more shakier and there is concern over who is actually in charge; and the Kerry-Luger legislation has set the stage for greater US involvement in the civil administration of Pakistan.

If Pakistan was a dangerous place before 26/11, it has become infinitely more volatile in the ensuing 14 months. This is no doubt tough on the Pakistani people, particularly that section of the middle classes which is more at ease in Mumbai and Delhi than at home. To be unable to reciprocate their goodwill towards India is painful and there is a very strong case for enlarging the scope of people-to-people contacts with Pakistan, if only to showcase India’s soft power.

India could certainly do with more visits by Pakistani cricketers, musicians, artists, novelists and others who are genuinely committed to cross-border amity. There is even a case for unilaterally allowing more Pakistani traders to sell their fruits, carpets and shoes to access the Indian market without expecting reciprocity. If this is what is meant by 'peace', India should be prepared to go the extra mile.

But that's where it has to stop for the moment. As far as Government-to-Government relations are concerned, India has absolutely no reason to let down its guard. At least not until there is conclusive evidence that the Pakistani establishment has become weary of persisting with a policy that is aimed at causing maximum pain to India.

The Government of India must not blink.

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